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Background
A securities loan is a transaction in which the lender (a securities owner) temporarily transfers securities to another party, a securities borrower, for compensation (see Figure 1 ). This transfer is secured by collateral which can be cash, securities, or another form of financial commitment such as a letter of credit.
There are typically three parties participating in securities lending activity: the lender that owns the securities, the securities borrower, and a lending agent that facilitates the transaction between lender and borrower. 8 The agent may also manage the reinvestment of any cash collateral associated with the securities loans, pursuant to the investments guideline set forth by the securities owner. Agents often lessen the lender's risk by indemnifying lenders against the risk that the value of the pledged collateral will be insufficient to repurchase the loaned security should the security not be returned by the borrower. Indemnification against loss due to loss of principal in cash reinvestment is less common, but is also evident in the pilot data.
Compensation arrangements between the lender and the borrower depend on the nature of collateral for the loaned security. When collateral for a security loan is in the form of other securities, the borrower pays the lender a fee. The fee is a function of the availability of the security being borrowed. Securities in high demand command a higher fee.
When collateral for a security loan is in the form of cash, the security lender pays a rebate rate to the borrower. Similar to the lending fee, the rebate rate is a function of the availability of the security being borrowed. However, because the rebate rate is paid by the lender to the borrower, the rebate rate for a security in high demand can be low or even negative. 9 The lender derives compensation from the interest earned on cash collateral reinvestment. The total compensation for the lender is a function of the investment returns on the cash collateral and the rebate rate. Lenders typically share a portion of their total compensation with the agent and it is common for the lender to retain most of it.
Many types of market participants engage in securities lending. It contributes substantially to market quality through its roles in market making, facilitating trade settlement, and short selling.
10 Securities lending increases short-term market liquidity by allowing market makers to increase temporarily the supply of securities available to meet demand for those securities. In these ways, securities lending is vital to smooth market functioning.
11 Given the importance of this market, the authors believe that there is a need for a more comprehensive view of securities 8 Some lenders do not rely on third-party agent lenders, but use internal departments to execute their securities lending activity. Such internal departments may have the same incentive and risk considerations as do unaffiliated lending agents. 9 A negative rebate rate means that the lender receives the rebate rate from the borrower. 10 Short selling can serve several purposes. In general, investors use short selling to profit from an expected downward price movement. Some investors may hedge the risk of an economic long position by engaging in short selling of a related security. Market intermediaries sometimes use short selling to provide liquidity when faced with unanticipated demand for certain securities. lending activity to assist financial regulators in identifying and addressing potential systemic risks.
Figure 1. Main Securities Lending Participants
Note: The lists of securities lenders/owners and borrowers are for illustration only and are not exhaustive. Broker-dealers often have a right to re-use borrowed securities in another transaction. Lending agents typically do not know whether a broker-dealer re-uses the loaned security. Source: authors' analysis There may be the potential for systemic stability risks associated with securities lending. For example, in many securities loans against cash collateral, the securities and the cash collateral must be returned on demand. However, cash is generally reinvested, and its sudden withdrawal may result in losses of the collateral's principal value due to liquidity and maturity transformations.
12 During the 2007-09 financial crisis, some securities lenders experienced large losses stemming from aggressive practices of cash reinvestment. For example, cash received in securities loan transactions was reinvested in higher yielding but long-dated and less liquid securities. In one case, these losses were so sizable that they contributed to distress at American International Group, Inc. (AIG), threatening a disorderly liquidation that would have destabilized global financial markets. After the financial crisis, many securities lenders revised their collateral management policies to reduce exposures to risks emanating from cash reinvestment in long-dated or high-risk assets. Cash collateral reinvestment practices of some lenders have reportedly become more conservative since the financial crisis.
14 In addition to regulatory limits imposed on some securities owners, 15 regulators have taken further steps to reduce risks and improve transparency of cash pools that securities owners commonly use for cash reinvestment purposes. 16 Finally, securities owners increasingly accept securities as collateral (see Tables 1 and 13 ).
In 2015, staff from the OFR, the Federal Reserve System and the SEC launched a pilot data collection focused on securities lending activity. Seven large lending agents voluntarily participated in the pilot. Benchmarked against available market size data, securities lending activity facilitated by agents participating in this pilot represent a significant share of the total activity.
17 However, the pilot did not capture all securities lending agents or the bilateral activity conducted without agent participation. A more broad-based permanent data collection would provide consistent and comprehensive coverage of this activity. A securities lending data collection could complement the bilateral repo data collection currently under consideration because both are considered necessary for effective monitoring of financial stability. 
How the Data Collection was Organized
The pilot participants provided a snapshot of their securities lending book at the closing of each of three reporting days in 2015: Oct. 9, Nov. 10, and Dec. 31. Each snapshot included three related sets of data elements (see Table A in the appendix for a complete list of variables collected):
 Inventory of securities available for lending;  Transaction-level detail for outstanding securities loans; and  Cash and noncash collateral information.
14 See, for example, BlackRock, Inc., "Securities Lending: The Facts," Viewpoint, May 2015 (available at www.blackrock.com/corporate/en-at/literature/whitepaper/viewpoint-securities-lending-the-facts-may-2015.pdf). 15 For example, registered investment companies are restricted by SEC rules to lending no more than one-third of their total assets. See "Securities Lending by U.S. Open-End and Closed-End Investment Companies," Feb. 27, 2014 (available at www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/securities-lending-open-closed-end-investment-companies.htm). 16 For example, money market mutual funds, which are often used to reinvest cash collateral, are now subject to more stringent risk limits and transparency rules. See SEC's final rule issued July 23, 2014, and published in the Federal Register on August 14, 2014, "Money Market Fund Reform; Amendments to Form PF." 17 A lack of data standardization and uneven coverage makes it difficult to estimate with precision the total amount of securities lending activity. See Viktoria Baklanova, Adam Copeland, and Rebecca McCaughrin, "Reference Guide to U.S. Repo and Securities Lending Markets," OFR Working Paper no. 15-17, Sept. 9, 2015 (available at financialresearch.gov/working-papers/files/OFRwp-2015-17_Reference-Guide-to-U.S.-Repo-and-SecuritiesLending-Markets.pdf). 18 For more information about the bilateral repo data collection, see Viktoria Baklanova, Cecilia Caglio, Marco Cipriani, and Adam Copeland, "The U.S. Bilateral Repo Market: Lessons from a New Survey," OFR Brief Series no. 16-01, Jan. 13, 2016 (available at financialresearch.gov/briefs/files/OFRbr-2016-01_US-Bilateral-Repo-MarketLessons-from-Survey.pdf). See also supra note 6.
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To classify securities owners, the Agency Lending Disclosure (ALD) standard was used. 19 The ALD standard includes 25 categories of securities owners. For the purpose of this analysis, the 25 ALD categories of securities owners were arranged into six distinct groups:
1. Pension funds and endowments, including ERISA pension plans, non-ERISA pension plans, corporate pension funds, state pension funds, foundations, and labor unions; 2. Investment firms, including 1940 Act registered investment companies, other investment companies, hedge funds, partnerships, UCITS, investment trusts, common trusts, collective trusts, and other trusts; 3. Banks and broker-dealers, including credit unions; 4. Governmental entities, including central banks, sovereign wealth fund, and supranational entities; 5. Others, including corporate entities; 6. Insurance companies.
Due to the confidentiality restrictions that some securities owners place on their agents, not all respondents provided categories of all of their securities owners. This limitation reflects the global nature of the business, the variation in legal constraints on customer disclosure across jurisdictions, and the voluntary nature of the pilot data collection.
Data Description and Analysis
This section describes the data collected. The discussion is organized in four parts: statistics concerning the sample coverage, information concerning securities owners and securities borrowers, attributes of the securities loans, and collateral management and cash reinvestment practices. Table 1 reports the aggregate market value of securities available for lending and securities on loan by collateral type. Over the three reporting days, lending agents reported, on average, $9.4 trillion in securities available for lending. There were, on average, $1 trillion in securities loans outstanding or about 11 percent of the lendable assets. The collateral received was about equally split between cash ($532 billion) and noncash ($487 billion). Table 2 reports the market value of lendable assets by the organizational type of the entity making the securities available for lending. Across the three reporting dates, investment firms, on average, had nearly $3 trillion of securities available for lending, the most of any securities owner type. However, due to existing legal restrictions, this figure may overstate the value of securities that investment firms could actually lend. For example, one type of investment firm, a registered investment company, cannot have on loan at any time securities representing more than one-third of the fund's total value. 20 Despite this restriction, the agents may report the total value of a fund as available for lending. This is because neither the lender, who owns the securities, nor its agent knows which securities will be in demand. The agent would make securities from a given portfolio unavailable when the value of securities on loan reaches the cap imposed by the securities' owner.
Sizing the Securities Lending Market
Securities Owners and Borrowers
Of types of securities owners, pension funds and endowments had the second largest supply of securities available for lending, on average $2.5 trillion. This statistic has similar limitations: while the agent may report the entire portfolio as "available for lending," pension fund trustees may place restrictions on the portion of the portfolio that may actually be on loan at any time. Table 3 reports the market value of securities on loan by the organizational type of the entity making the securities available for lending. Across the three reporting dates, pension funds and endowments, on average, had $332 billion in market value of securities on loan, the most of any securities owner type. Governmental entities had the second largest volume of securities on loan, on average $327 billion. Table 4 reports the market values of securities on loan by type of securities borrower for each reporting date. The average value of all securities on loan across three reporting dates was $1 trillion. Broker-dealers were the largest borrowers, collectively borrowing $869 billion in market value of securities. Hedge funds and state pension funds together borrowed less than $10 billion. Although the pilot cannot identify such cases, broker-dealers often borrow securities on behalf of their clients. These clients may be hedge funds or other types of firms. Table 5 reports the value of securities available for lending and on loan by asset class. U.S. equity securities were the largest type of securities available for lending ($3.2 trillion), but only 10 percent (or $315 billion) was actually on loan. Of U.S. Treasuries and agencies, $302 billion in securities was on loan, which represented 27 percent of the lendable securities in this category.
Securities Inventory and Loan Data
Approximately 81 percent of loans of U.S. corporate bonds and 70 percent of loans of U.S. equity securities were collateralized by cash. In contrast, only about half of loans of U.S. Treasuries and agencies were collateralized by cash collateral (48 percent). The survey data allowed us to calculate the actual number of days the securities loans have been outstanding as of the reporting date. These data indicate that securities loans tend to have longer rolled over maturities than suggested by the prevalence of the contractually open loans, which can be terminated on demand.
Nonetheless, the open maturity of the majority of securities loans implies that cash reinvestment activity must consider liquidity and maturity of the related investment in the context of liabilities that can mature at any time. Note: Securities with a security type of "Not Available" are included along with the other six security types in the Total column.
The total market value of such loans was $38 billion. U.S. Treasury/Agency securities include agency mortgage-backed securities and debentures. Columns may not total 100 percent due to rounding. Sources: Securities Lending Data Collection Pilot, Markit Group, Ltd., authors' calculations.
As discussed above, the lending fee is the fee paid by the securities borrower to the lender in a securities loan collateralized by other securities. 22 Table 8 reports securities lending fees on open security loans by security type borrowed. Securities lending fees reflect the value or price of a security in the collateral market. 23 For the three sample days in the pilot the mean lending fees by security type showed that, on average, security lending fees for loans of foreign equity securities were highest, followed by those for U.S. corporate bonds, U.S. equities, foreign corporate bonds, U.S. government securities, and foreign sovereign bonds.
On two reporting days, the mean lending fee for borrowing U.S. equity securities exceed the 95 th percentile lending fee. This result can be explained by the presence of special securities with very high lending fees that compose less than 5 percent of the market-weighted sample. Table 9 reports rebate rates on contractually open security loans collateralized with cash by securities type borrowed. As mentioned above, securities loans against cash collateral remain the most common form of securities loan transactions in the United States, comprising 52 percent of securities loans in our sample, on average, across the three reporting days. Cash collateral is reinvested in other securities or pooled investment vehicles. 24 Margins on securities loans are negotiable. The variation around the standard margins of 102 and 105 percent can be attributed to firm-specific differences in margining policies and the quality and type of the collateral security.
The pilot data included some extreme values for required margin that may be explained by either the inability to price the loaned security or margining practices for multiple borrowings by a single borrower. Alternatively, agent lending firms may manage margin across all loans for a given borrower account. As a result, the margin for a particular loan may not reflect its idiosyncratic risks. This practice may lead to some specific loans appear to be undercollateralized while others appear to be over-collateralized. Table 11 reports the fraction of securities loans that are indemnified against loss if the pledged collateral is insufficient to replace the lent security should the borrower default on the loan. Indemnification continues to be a common practice among lending agents participating in the pilot. Table 13 reports information on indemnification of cash reinvestments. In addition to indemnifying securities owners against losses due to a borrower default, agents sometimes indemnify securities owners against potential losses incurred through cash reinvestment. The survey data suggest that agents often indemnify the principal amount of cash reinvested in the repo market, but not if reinvested in the direct purchases of securities. Both cash reinvestment indemnification and securities loan indemnification provide additional protections to the securities owners, but expose the lending agent to risk.
The securities owner type that is most often indemnified against losses from cash collateral reinvestment is government entities, with 37 to 38 percent of their reinvested cash collateral being indemnified. The least often indemnified are insurance companies and investment firms, each with 7 to 8 percent of their reinvested cash collateral indemnified. Table 14 reports the market value of accepted noncash collateral by security type on each reporting date. Sovereign or supranational debt represented 36 to 38 percent of the total and was the largest category of seven security types posted as collateral. U.S. Treasury and agency debt accounted for 28 to 32 percent of the total. Equity securities accounted for 27 to 33 percent of the total. The remainder, summing to 2 percent of the total, was split among corporate bonds, private structured debt, and "other" types (see Table B in the appendix for a complete list of reported security types for noncash collateral). 
Next Steps
As noted earlier, securities lending is important to well-functioning capital markets, and can expose market participants to significant risk. Given its importance, there is a need for a comprehensive view of securities lending activity. This view would assist financial regulators in 16 identifying and addressing potential risks to financial stability. The data collection pilot was a first step in understanding the data available from market participants as well as the complexities involved in collecting and aggregating the data. Insights from the data collection pilot will prove invaluable in designing any potential reporting scheme for a more permanent data collection.
26
Challenges remain in collecting and interpreting securities lending market data. More work must be done to ensure data quality through the use of appropriate standards. Such standards include the legal entity identifier (LEI) and the categorization of financial instruments. Staff from U.S. regulators are working with international regulatory bodies to examine potential steps to harmonize reporting requirements, definitions, and concepts.
